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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 
Ken Ash, Deputy Director for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, OECD, Paris 
INTRODUCTION 
  Governments have long intervened in domestic and international markets for food 
and agriculture products. The apparent rationale for doing so has changed over time, but the 
nature of the policies in place across the OECD-area has evolved much more slowly. The 
result today is a complex web of policies, generally aimed at a diversity of sometimes 
competing objectives, and an assortment of both intended and unintended effects. 
  This paper highlights the links, and the disconnections, between food and agriculture 
policy objectives, instruments, and impacts in Canada, Mexico, the United States (the 
NAFTA countries) and the European Union (EU). These countries account for more than one-
third of world trade in food and agriculture products, and at the same time provide their 
farmers with more than two-thirds of the support available to farmers across the OECD area. 
What are their farm policies trying to achieve? How are they pursuing their objectives? What 
are the effects of these efforts, domestically and internationally? Are there more effective 
policy alternatives? What are the prospects for further agricultural policy reform? The 
following sections draw primarily on work undertaken at the OECD to address these 
questions. 
1 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 
  The objectives of agricultural policy are not always precisely and explicitly stated; 
this, of course, makes assessment of policy performance more difficult. But in general terms, 
at least, the 'shared goals' agreed by OECD Agriculture Ministers in 1998 reflect the range of 
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current policy interests in the NAFTA countries as well as in the EU. These include, "... (to) 
ensure that the agro-food sector: 
−  is responsive to market signals; 
−  is efficient, sustainable, viable and innovative, so as to provide opportunities to improve 
standards of living for producers; 
−  is further integrated into the multilateral trading system; 
−  provides consumers with access to adequate and reliable supplies of food, which meets 
their concerns, in particular with regard to safety and quality; 
−  contributes to the sustainable management of natural resources and the quality of the 
environment; 
−  contributes to the socio-economic development of rural areas; 
−  contributes to food security at the national and global levels”. 
2 
Farm policy goals 
Canada introduced its Agricultural Policy Framework in 2003, marking an explicit effort to set out an integrated 
and comprehensive policy framework. Specific objectives are to enhance the profitability of the agriculture and 
agri-food sector, to reduce agricultural risks and provide benefits to the health of water, air, and soils, to ensure 
compatibility between biodiversity and agriculture, and to increase the level of investment in innovation in 
agricultural products. See http://www.agr.gc.ca/cb/apf/index_e.php?section=info&group=accord&page=accord 
Mexico approved its National Agreement on Agriculture (Acuerdo Nacional para el Campo) in 2003. This 
document is not a law but an agreement between farmers’ organizations and the Federal Government, which 
results from a broad national consultation and defines the main lines of agricultural policies in the medium run. 
Two main broad objectives are identified: social development of rural areas particularly focused on achieving 
equal opportunities for rural and urban inhabitants; and ensuring sufficient and healthy food for the Mexican 
population. Other objectives are also noted, such as protecting the right of farmers and the indigenous population 
in rural areas to preserve and improve their own forms of production. 
There are no specific objectives contained in the US Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, though 
the implicit objectives of the various Titles of the legislation seem evident. A number of USDA publications can 
be drawn upon to specify American farm policy interests (for example, Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking 
Stock for the New Century and A Safety Net for Farm Households). 
 In the case of the EU, objectives assigned to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are found in Article 33 
(formerly Article 39) of the EC Treaty. These have since been enhanced, and are outlined in a 2002 
Communication from the Commission, Mid-Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
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.     Clearly, much is expected of the food and agriculture sector. Some decades ago a 
primary aim of farm policy was to increase output, particularly for domestic consumption and 
soon thereafter for export markets as well. Explicit interests today are more diverse, and 
encompass contributions to rural community well-being, rural amenities, biodiversity, 
landscape, flood control, and other issues often associated with the concepts of 
multifunctionality and non-trade concerns. On the other hand, the aim of protecting and 
supporting the incomes of farm households has long been, and remains, a conspicuous 
element of farm policy in many OECD countries. 
  Overall, agricultural policy objectives continue to change, implicitly and explicitly, 
in response to societal interests, some objectives can be in conflict with others, and trade-offs 
amongst these interests are often required. How are these changing objectives being translated 
into policy action? 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY SUPPORT: LEVELS AND INSTRUMENTS 
  The OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Directorate has been monitoring and 
evaluating agricultural policies in OECD countries for almost twenty years. A substantial 
database covering both the level and the nature of agricultural support has been developed 
within the framework of the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) methodology. In this context, 
the associated level of support to agriculture is measured and the nature of the policy 
instruments is described, with a view to assessing the potential impacts of various categories 
of support on production, consumption, trade, incomes and the environment.
3 
  In 2003, support to producers in OECD countries, as measured by the PSE, was 257 
billion USD (the NAFTA countries, taken together, and the EU accounted for USD 50 billion 
and USD 121 billion, respectively). To enable meaningful cross-country comparisons, the 
(absolute) PSE is expressed as a percentage of the value of gross farm receipts (% PSE). The 
% PSE for the OECD area as a whole was 32% in 2003, compared with an average of 37% in 
the 1986-88 period. In 2003 the %PSE in Canada was 21%, Mexico 19%, the US 18%, and 
the EU 37%. 
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  These averages do not tell the whole story as there are wide variations in support 
levels across commodities, and a number of “sensitive” products receive support at levels well 
above the (already high) OECD average (figures 1.a – 1.d). In Canada, milk stands out as the 
commodity that receives a very high level of support (55%), while most other commodities 
receive much lower levels of support (less than 20%). For Mexico, oilseeds (53%), sugar 
(48%), milk (40%), maize (39%), rice (35%), other grains (32%) and wheat (31%) receive 
very high levels of support. In the US, commodities receiving very high levels of support 
include sugar (58%), milk (48%), rice (46%), wheat and other grains (each 35%); other 
commodities receive support at much lower levels (generally 20% and less). Commodities 
receiving very high levels of support in the EU include beef and veal (74%), sugar (56%), 
sheepmeat (53%), other grains (52%), milk (47%), wheat (45%), rice and poultry (37%), and 
oilseeds and maize (36%). 
  While the level of support provided to producers is certainly relevant, the nature of 
this support is even more important in understanding alternative policy approaches and their 
impacts. Policies in place in OECD countries are categorised as follows. 
  Market price support (MPS) measures the gap between higher domestic prices 
received by producers and paid by consumers, relative to prices on world markets. These 
higher prices are regulated (or administered) by governments, and maintained via border 
protection. This type of support distorts production, consumption and trade, and can have a 
negative effect on the environment. By raising domestic prices, it effectively acts as a 
regressive tax on consumers. Payments based on output are budget (taxpayer) financed, and 
affect prices received by producers. As such, they distort production and trade and can harm 
the environment to the same extent as MPS, but do not directly affect consumption. Payments 
based on input use are also budget financed, and serve to reduce certain input costs. They can 
be more or less distorting than the above two categories, depending on the input concerned, 
and can also have a negative effect on the environment. These three production linked forms 
of support are all highly trade distorting. 
  The remaining types of support are all budget financed and are, to varying degrees, 
more decoupled from production decisions and therefore less trade distorting. Payments based 
on area planted/animal numbers remain linked to production, but not to intensity of 
production nor to output. They encourage production at higher than otherwise levels and              Ash                                                                         5          
                                                                                                             
hence distort trade, but at much lower levels than the above noted measures. Payments based 
on historical entitlements (that are not updated nor otherwise revised) no longer influence 
current production decisions in a direct way, and have a still smaller impact on production and 
trade. Other payments, such as those based on farm income, can be more targeted to specific 
objectives and beneficiaries and generally have the least impact on production and trade of 
any farm policies. 
  In the mid-80s price and output based support and input subsidies accounted for 90% 
of support to farmers across the OECD area, and by 2003 this had declined to 75%. Within 
these aggregates, significant differences are evident in the pace of reform across countries 
(figure 2). Market price support, payments based on output, and payments based on input use, 
taken together, have declined more significantly in Canada and the EU than in Mexico and the 
US. However, even after these reforms the composition of support in all four cases continues 
to be dominated by production linked measures. And as shown in figure 1, reliance on these 
different policy instruments varies considerably across commodities, even within countries. 
How are farm households and world markets affected by this mix of current policies? 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY IMPACTS 
  Across the OECD area, only about 25 cents of every dollar of production-based 
support actually finds its way into the producer's pocket. The balance of the support is either 
capitalised into asset values, particularly land, or is transferred up or down the food chain to 
input suppliers, processors and distributors. Because so much of the support is reflected in 
higher land values, the result over time is a higher cost structure and reduced farm 
competitiveness. While there is a wealth gain for farmers that own land at the time such 
policies are introduced, farmers who subsequently rent or purchase land at these higher prices 
will face reduced profitability and lower incomes.
4 The same applies, of course, to land costs 
for alternative, non-farm uses in rural areas. 
  There is another consequence of such a high reliance on price and output based 
support. The largest farm operations, which generally are also the most profitable, and the 
most wealthy, receive most of the benefits (figure 3). In Canada, the largest 25% of farms 
have average gross farm receipts of 300 000 $CDN.  They produce 63% of farm output and 
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receive 75% of support. In the US, the largest 25% of farms have average gross farm receipts 
of over 275 000 USD and average farm net worth of over 780 000 USD. They produce 90% 
of farm output and receive 89% of support. In the EU, the largest 25% of farms have average 
gross farm receipts of over 180 000 euros and average farm net worth of almost 500 000 
euros. They produce 73% of farm output and receive 70% of support. In all cases, the 
remaining 75% of farms, produce relatively little, receive little support, but often have a 
sizeable average farm net worth.
5 
  Much of the support provided by existing policies may in fact widen the income gap 
between large and small farmers, rather than narrow it. This seems to be confirmed by 
structural trends which broadly confirm an increasing number of large farms, a more stable 
number of small farms (with a high reliance on off-farm income), and continuing decreases in 
the number of medium size farms. Farm household income levels are, on average, equivalent 
to those of other households, more as a result of increases in off-farm income than as a 
consequence of current policies. And there is also a higher incidence of low income amongst 
farm households, which is not addressed by current policies. 
  Neither do many current policies effectively address policy objectives not explicitly 
linked to income. For example, measures aimed at one widely shared policy objective - 
encouraging provision of environmental services or reducing environmental damage - 
represent less than 4% of support to producers in both NAFTA countries and the EU. In some 
cases, these policies may simply offset some of the negative effects of production-linked 
support. As a result, any benefits realised are at a higher cost than would be the case in the 
absence of the very policies that comprise the majority of support. Similarly, measures aimed 
at improving rural community well-being represent no more than 4% of support in NAFTA 
countries and the EU. While in both cases support has increased somewhat in recent years, it 
is from a relatively low base and remains dwarfed by traditional commodity production 
support.  
  Production linked policies also have important international spill-overs. Existing 
policies provide significant incentives to produce, thereby increasing global supplies and 
lowering world prices, to the detriment of competitive suppliers elsewhere. Market 
                                                      
5.  OECD (2003), Farm Household Incomes: Issues and Policy Responses. Note, corresponding data 
on Mexico is not available.               Ash                                                                         7          
                                                                                                             
interventions, which dominate current policies, typically need trade policies to hold them in 
place. For example, a support measure that sustains the domestic price above the level at 
which a country can import requires an accompanying restriction on imports. When the extent 
of support is such that a country is transformed from a net importer to one with a disposable 
surplus, the use of export subsidies may also be required. In short, trade policies are often a 
by-product of domestic policies. 
  The Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient is derived from PSE data, and 
measures the ratio between the average price received at the farm gate and the border price. It 
is an indicator of protection from external competitors, rather than an indicator of support per 
se. For example, support for milk is mainly a result of maintaining high domestic prices, 
relative to world prices, and the associated level of market protection is exceptionally high. 
Prices received by producers and paid by consumers for these commodities in the NAFTA 
countries and the EU are in the range of 50 - 100% higher than world market prices. While 
support to wheat remains high in these countries as well, it is provided primarily in the form 
of direct payments rather than regulated prices. As a result, prices received by producers are 
much closer to world market prices for wheat. Overall, across the OECD area, the level of 
protection resulting from alternative policy instruments varies widely across commodities 
(figure 4). Clearly, the link between domestic and trade policies is highly dependant on the 
nature of the domestic policy instrument. 
  The long-term trend of agricultural productivity growing more rapidly than demand 
implies continued adjustment pressures at the global level. Trade protection does not change 
this fact; it simply shifts the burden of adjustment to other countries, and often triggers other 
country efforts to protect their own farmers from this ‘imported’ adjustment pressure. The 
result, especially prior to multilateral efforts to redress this process, has been an upward spiral 
of support and protection. 
  In light of changing policy objectives and the poor performance of many existing 
farm policies it is striking that there have not been more significant shifts in the composition 
of support. Policies put in place decades ago primarily to encourage production and to support 
farm incomes, whatever their actual impacts may have been, are unlikely to happen to be the 
policies that would most effectively contribute to achieving the wider diversity of interests 
that comprise so much of the public policy debate today.              Ash                                                                         8          
                                                                                                             
  Various studies have been undertaken to assess the gains from reducing or 
eliminating trade protection in agriculture. While estimates vary, the potential gains are very 
large, and while they accrue to both developing and developed countries, the largest 
beneficiaries are the countries which currently have the highest levels of trade distorting 
support and protection. This would include many countries in the OECD-area. 
  In short, much of current food and agriculture policy is not working as intended. 
Some policy instruments serve primarily to raise prices and increase output, whereas the 
apparent objective is something entirely different. Benefits mainly accrue to the highest 
income and wealthiest segment of the farm population (at the expense of less well-off 
consumers), and not to the farm households who may often be the intended beneficiaries. 
Some policy objectives (such as supporting aggregate or average farm income levels) appear 
to be founded on structural and financial conditions that no longer exist. The range and 
relative importance of policy objectives have changed, while the policy instruments in place 
have not. Current production-based policies are not effective in achieving the diversity of 
other objectives (such as environmental sustainability or rural development) often attributed 
to them. The unintended spill-over effects on global markets, and other countries, are large 
and are negative. Are there more effective alternatives? 
How large are the gains from trade liberalisation? 
6 
A standard tool used by economists to estimate the income gains generated by trade liberalisation 6 and the 
distribution of those gains 6 is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The virtue of CGE models is that 
they take into account the linkages between different sectors and economies, and can therefore account for the 
impacts that trade reforms have on the patterns of specialisation and trade National governments, international 
organisations and independent researchers have all used CGE models, many of them based on the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model maintained at Purdue University in the United States. 
  A study undertaken by the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(2001) using a modified version of GTAP finds that a full elimination of all agricultural policy distortions would 
yield long-term global welfare gains of USD 56 billion a year. ABARE (2000), using its own CGE model (based 
partly on GTAP) finds larger benefits, estimating that a 50% cut in agricultural protection between 2005 and 
2010 would lead to total welfare gains of USD 53 billion a year by 2010.  If a 50% cut were also applied to 
protection of textiles, motor vehicles and other manufactures, the welfare gains would increase to USD 94 billion 
by 2010. A more general study published by the European Commission (1999) uses GTAP to consider the 
impact of across-the-board reductions in border protection in all sectors and all countries. This study finds that a  
20% global cut in protection, accompanied by a modest amount of trade facilitation (reducing transactions costs 
by 1%), would yield annual welfare gains of USD 220 billion. These gains jump to USD 400 billion a year in the 
case of a 50% cut. The results are similar to those of the World Bank (1999), which finds gains of USD 260 
billion a year from the liberalisation of all goods markets. 
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These estimates provide context for the narrower results of the OECD’s Policy Evaluation Matrix (PEM) model 
(2001), which considers the benefits to producers, consumers and taxpayers of a 10% reduction in support to 
crop producers in Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland and the United States. The PEM 
model estimates that such a modest reform package would produce annual welfare gains of USD 2.6 billion. 
  The above model estimates are difficult to compare. Even when the same CGE model is used, different 
liberalisation scenarios are applied and policies may be modeled in different ways. Nevertheless, some common 
points stand out. First, the potential gains from agricultural trade reform are large. Second agriculture accounts 
for a substantial share of the total potential gains from economy-wide trade reforms. Third, most countries are 
likely to benefit, while some of those net food importers that lose from agricultural reforms may nevertheless 
benefit form a broader liberalisation package. Fourth, developing countries would be major beneficiaries, 
although a small number of net-importers and highly specialised exporters may lose out, in the absence o 
appropriate adjustment strategies and assistance. 
Some policy-makers, notably in developing countries, have questioned the robustness of these results, on the 
grounds that similarly large gains were also predicted prior to the Uruguay Round yet have failed to materialise. 
However, as this paper points out, the Uruguay Round Agreement resulted in much more modest reductions in 
actual protection than were originally envisaged. For the estimated benefits to be realised reductions in actual 
protection levels would need to be of the magnitudes assumed in these analyses. 
ALTERNATIVE POLICY APPROACHES 
  There are alternatives to many existing farm policies that would both improve 
domestic performance and eliminate the need for all trade protection other than science-based 
measures necessary to protect plant, animal and human health. 
  Moving from trade protection and production linked support to more decoupled and 
targeted measures would greatly reduce, but not completely eliminate, trade distortions. 
Agriculture-specific subsidies of any kind, especially if they are large, have an impact on 
trade, because they provide an incentive to produce and therefore influence the pattern of 
specialisation among countries. But the severity of these impacts depends very much on the 
policy instrument that is used. For example, open-ended price supports provide a direct 
stimulus to production (and choke off consumption), leading to a strong impact on trade. Area 
payments have a weaker production effect because they provide an incentive to bring 
additional land into production, but not necessarily to increase yield on that land. Direct 
income payments have a smaller impact still.  
  The Positive Reform Agenda elaborated at the OECD, and agreed by all member 
countries, sets out alternative agricultural policy options for governments which would enable 
them to achieve their stated objectives and at the same time avoid negative, unintended 
consequences at home and abroad. The fundamental tenets of this agenda are straightforward.              Ash                                                                         10          
                                                                                                             
  The first requirement is that governments need to be clear about what their objectives 
are. In particular, policy objectives need to be defined in a measurable way, such that the cost-
effectiveness of alternative approaches can be compared. This would improve the 
transparency of policy-making and help overcome some of the political obstacles to reform. 
  The stated objectives of agricultural policies in OECD countries fall into two 
categories: those concerned with the incomes of farm households, and those designed to 
address other societal concerns such as the environment, the provision of rural amenities, land 
and water management, food safety and food security. In each case, government policies are 
introduced because of the belief that private markets alone may not lead to optimal outcomes. 
  The Positive Reform Agenda suggests that if policies in each of these areas are to be 
fully effective, they need to address their objectives directly. In the case of agricultural 
incomes, targeted direct income payments to households that are de-linked from production 
are much more effective at raising net incomes than sector-wide market interventions such as 
price support. Similarly, the wider costs and benefits of agricultural activity could be tackled 
more efficiently at source, for example by charging for social costs (such as pollution) and by 
paying for social benefits that the market alone may under-provide (such as a pleasing 
countryside). 
  Such a re-focusing of policies would in turn enable a reduction in the overall level of 
support. Moving away from blunt instruments such as price supports to more targeted policies 
would not only be more effective, it would reduce the domestic burden on consumers and 
taxpayers, and enable harmful import barriers and export subsidies to be eliminated. Three 
examples demonstrate how these principles could begin to be put into practice. 
Ensuring adequate farm household income from one year to the next is a 
longstanding policy objective in many OECD countries. Although there is no evidence of a 
widespread income problem in agriculture, some farm households in all OECD countries do 
have systemically low incomes. Effective policy responses would address the root causes of 
their low incomes. In some cases, policies to improve farm profitability might be needed, for 
example through initiatives to upgrade skills or adopt new technologies. In other cases, 
measures to improve off-farm income or create employment opportunities in other sectors 
might be more appropriate, for example via broader economic and rural development 
initiatives. In attempting to protect low income farm households, and provide them with better              Ash                                                                         11          
                                                                                                             
alternatives, the social policies available for low income households generally might be the 
most effective. Farm households also face risks that are beyond their control, such as 
exceptionally bad weather or some plant or animal diseases. Governments may wish to ensure 
that households have the tools they need to manage such risks effectively, by providing a 
viable environment for futures markets or whole farm income insurance schemes. 
The well-being of rural communities is also a widely held policy objective. In 
general, across the OECD area, agriculture no longer constitutes a major element of economic 
activity in rural areas. There are exceptions, of course, and agriculture does remain an 
important source of employment and income in some regions. At the same time, it is clear that 
farm policy is not synonymous with rural policy, and that farm policy does not constitute 
effective rural policy. Effective policy actions would target the underlying causes of economic 
disadvantages in specific places and regions. In particular, there may be systemic policy bias 
against some rural and remote areas that could be eliminated. For example, physical 
infrastructure and essential public services might be more costly to establish and to maintain, 
resulting in underinvestment in some rural areas. This would exacerbate disadvantages 
relating to distance from populations and markets. Strategic investments in information 
technology could, for example, enable rural businesses to compete effectively from relatively 
remote areas. In some cases, initiatives to encourage entrepreneurship, small business start-
up, and risk taking (for example, venture capital schemes or business training and advisory 
services) might be helpful. Overall, local multi-sector initiatives, rather than traditional farm 
commodity programmes, would be expected to perform more effectively in contributing to 
sustainable economic development in rural areas. 
OECD countries seek to ensure environmental sustainability. But the majority of 
current support, being linked to output, provides farmers with incentives to increase the 
intensity of production and also to expand farm production on environmentally sensitive land. 
While more attention is now given to agri-environmental issues, notably in the form of 
regulation, relatively little support is targeted to environmental objectives. Effective policy 
actions would pay directly for any positive impacts (such as the maintenance of biodiversity 
or the provision of a particular type of landscape), and tax or regulate negative ones. Both 
types of policy responses would be more effective if accompanied by the withdrawal of 
longstanding policies that encourage production of traditional commodities. It may also be 
appropriate to look for policy options outside the agricultural sector. Broader environmental              Ash                                                                         12          
                                                                                                             
policy might be further integrated with agriculture specific measures, with the aim of 
improving the performance of both sets of policies. 
OECD consumers and taxpayers will gain considerably from implementing the 
Positive Reform Agenda. So too will competitive food and agriculture suppliers in both 
developed and developing countries. Despite the prospect of aggregate gains, not everyone 
gains from liberalisation, at least in the short run. Some countries (notably some low income 
developing countries) may lose from agricultural trade liberalisation, including exporters with 
preferential trading arrangements who could see their preference margins eroded, and net food 
importers who could see their food import bills rise relative to what they would otherwise be. 
However, these countries can gain from a multi-sector agreement, and the challenge is to find 
ways of addressing their specific concerns in the context of a liberal trading environment (e.g. 
through Special and Differential Treatment), rather than to use such effects as a reason not to 
reform. Within countries, there will inevitably be winners and losers, with those who formerly 
benefited from protection standing to lose. Again, the optimal approach is to address those 
issues directly, via policies that ease the transition into more productive (and ultimately 
remunerative) activities, rather than to eschew reform altogether. 
But there will inevitably be some dislocation. For reform to be sustainable, these 
adjustment challenges need to be recognised and addressed. In some cases, it will be possible 
for farm households to adapt and remain within the sector, in which case temporary measures 
may facilitate a change in farming practices or scale of operation. In other cases, transitional 
support to enable farm households to shift into more viable employment opportunities may be 
needed, for example through labour market policies. Finally, reform can be facilitated with 
the backing of economy-wide social programmes. 
These examples of alternative policy approaches are illustrative, not prescriptive. The 
appropriate mix of policies will vary from one country to the next, and the process of reform 
will need to be managed carefully in each case. Reform can also be facilitated by explanation 
of the rationale for reform, by preparing people for its consequences, and by ensuring that 
agricultural reforms proceed consistently with reforms in other sectors. The overall direction 
that agricultural policy reforms should take is nevertheless clear, and the sooner those reforms 
are enacted, the sooner the benefits will be realised and the lower will be the associated costs. 
The reality today, of course, is that few countries have implemented such reforms, although a              Ash                                                                         13          
                                                                                                             
number of important steps in these directions have been made. What are the prospects for 
further reform? 
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
7 
  There have been notable farm policy developments recently in NAFTA countries and 
in the EU. 
  In Canada, major reforms to agricultural policy were introduced in the mid-90s as 
one element of a government-wide program review. Amongst other actions taken, support 
under the Western Grain Transportation Act was abolished. Other budgetary support in 
Canada has primarily been aimed at supporting incomes in the grains sector, combining crop 
insurance with program payments based on revenue or income. The 2003 Agricultural Policy 
Framework (APF) integrates direct income related initiatives into a comprehensive policy 
agenda that encompasses the environment, food safety, sector renewal, and science and 
innovation. The discovery of BSE in the Canadian beef herd immediately put a strain on this 
new policy framework, and a number of exceptional payments were announced to support 
beef producers.  In terms of multilateral trade negotiations, Canada has pursued reform across 
all three pillars of the URAA – market access, export subsidies and domestic support. At the 
same time, it continues to defend its supply management scheme, including associated border 
protection, for the dairy and poultry sector. 
  During the 90’s Mexico undertook major reform of agricultural policies. Land 
reform in 1992 (that required a constitutional change) allowed the movement from social 
forms of land ownership (Ejidos and Community land) to private ownership. This was 
followed by the progressive dismantling of the agencies in charge of administering domestic 
prices and the introduction of direct payments to farmers based on historical land 
entitlements. In 1994 PROCAMPO payments were introduced for historical producers of 
most crops, and in 1999 the state agency CONASUPO was closed. Trade policy reforms, in 
the context of both the NAFTA and the URAA, should lead to the opening of agricultural 
markets with North America by 2008. Mexico has also signed a number of regional free trade 
agreements, though none would lead to completely free trade in agriculture. Recently, a new 
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target price system for crops was introduced and additional subsidies to electricity used for 
agriculture were decided.  While this may signal some risk of slipping backwards, reforms to 
date remain impressive. 
  The US Fair Act of 1996 was widely heralded as a major turning point in US farm 
policy, with predetermined and declining direct payments, for some commodities, replacing 
support that had been more coupled to production. Reform in other industries, such as sugar 
and milk, was not achieved. But this progress was short-lived. Beginning in 1998, large, ad 
hoc "emergency payments" were provided to producers, and this level of support was 
effectively entrenched in the US Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. 
Importantly, the type of policy instruments used to deliver this support is more directly linked 
to production decisions and current commodity prices. At the same time, the US approach to 
current multilateral trade negotiations, at least seen from afar, seems aimed at achieving 
significant opening of agricultural markets. If this aim is realised, domestic policy reforms 
will also be required. 
  In the EU a number of reforms have been pursued, starting in 1992 and continuing in 
2000, which moved away from price based support, in particular through greater use of area 
and headage payments. As was the case in the US, reform was uneven across commodities, 
and little or no progress was achieved in the sugar and milk sectors. The “Fischler reform” of 
the Common Agricultural Policy takes an important step in the direction of further decoupling 
support from production decisions. This has to be welcomed enthusiastically by reform 
proponents, and the implementation experiences of EU member states will certainly be 
instructive in considering future policy directions across the EU. In the context of on-going 
multilateral negotiations, the EU has addressed the key issue of export subsidies in an 
unambiguous way, though its position on significant opening of markets – again, as seen from 
afar – is somewhat less clear. 
  So what might happen next? 
  Farm policy reforms can often be traced to a need to address emerging challenges 
(such as national budget deficits) or a desire to pursue exceptional opportunities (such as 
comprehensive, multilateral trade negotiations). The role of individual personalities and 
strong leadership can not be overlooked either. There is ample reason to be optimistic about 
further reforms in the near term.              Ash                                                                         15          
                                                                                                             
  At least two challenges might encourage governments in the direction outlined in the 
Positive Reform Agenda. The fiscal situation in some countries, including the US, is 
increasingly receiving attention. Relatively modest prospects for future economic growth, and 
an associated need to address apparent policy shortcomings, such as labour market rigidities 
in the EU, for example, is also more widely acknowledged.  
  The need for concrete action in these areas might also bring with it a lower level of 
tolerance for traditional farm policy approaches and their high consumer and taxpayer costs. 
Secondly, recent experience with various animal disease outbreaks, and the inability of 
existing policies to prevent, rectify or even adequately manage the economic consequences 
might contribute to a more critical re-examination of traditional policies and a greater 
willingness to entertain policy change. 
  There are also important opportunities to be pursued. There are significant economic 
benefits on offer to governments for reform of ineffective farm policies, even on a unilateral 
basis. Multilateral reform, though, has more to offer, as global markets are further opened to 
competitive suppliers. The largest gains would accrue to those countries which currently 
intervene in the sector the most, so there is a clear self-interest in pursuing more effective and 
efficient policies along the lines described earlier. In addition, a strong commitment to less 
developed countries remains on the table. If the promise of the agreed Doha Development 
Agenda is to be realised, NAFTA countries and the EU, and others of course, will simply 
have to deliver freer and fairer trade in agriculture and food products. Detailed modalities are 
always difficult, but the aim and the purpose can not be in doubt. 
CONCLUSION  
  A striking characteristic of the business environment in which many farms in the 
NAFTA countries and the EU operate is their relative isolation from many of the market and 
policy conditions that apply to other business activities. Many farm businesses are more 
strongly influenced by current and expected future farm policies than by market conditions 
and broader economy-wide policies. The economic rationale for such high reliance on 
relatively blunt output-based policy instruments is not evident. Given the diversity of policy 
objectives being pursued, a greater role for markets, for non-sectoral policies, and for              Ash                                                                         16          
                                                                                                             
coherent, complementary targeted farm policies is desirable. Such reforms are possible on a 
unilateral as well as a multilateral basis. 
  This does not mean that farm policy support needs to fall to zero, but it does mean 
that support levels need to be reduced. It also means that new policy approaches are needed to 
balance a nation’s right to re-distribute income and wealth and to ensure a suitable provision 
of public goods, with a nation’s responsibility to avoid taking any actions that impose unfair 
burdens on other countries. In practical terms, an essential first step is to formulate clear 
statements of explicit policy objectives, associated costs, intended beneficiaries, and desired 
outcomes. Only then can informed public policy choices be made. 
  Markets themselves may address some interests. For example, farm households can 
benefit significantly from non-farm employment and income opportunities. Many rural 
amenities can be supplied by various individuals and enterprises, and not just by farmers. 
Non-sectoral policies may address other objectives. For example, social security policy can 
provide support for farm households with systemic low incomes. Public investments in 
physical infrastructure, education and training, and research and development can contribute 
to various economic, environmental and social goals. Some environmental objectives can be 
addressed through economy-wide regulations and taxes (Polluter Pays Principle) or subsidies 
(where desired services are not otherwise available). And of course there is scope for targeted 
farm policies to address interests and objectives that are unique and specific to agriculture. 
  Good policy design requires consideration of a wide range of economic, social, and 
environmental factors that can vary across and within countries. Increased efforts to define 
alternative policy approaches, in response to clearly expressed interests and conditions, are 
warranted, by international organisations - such as OECD - as well as by national 
governments themselves. The choice of policy instrument to achieve explicit domestic goals 
is at the heart of food and agricultural policy reform. While trade policies form the basis of 
multilateral negotiations, there would be few trade tensions - and little to negotiate - if the 
Positive Reform Agenda were more aggressively implemented. 
  The available evidence makes a compelling case for further reform of agricultural 
policies, and for increased market openness. The benefits would be substantial: reduced costs 
to consumers and taxpayers, improved trade opportunities for competitive suppliers, less              Ash                                                                         17          
                                                                                                             
stress on the environment, and more effective policies that achieve their goals more 
efficiently. 
  There have been some positive developments recently. The share of producer support 
that is provided through more decoupled and better targeted policy instruments is increasing 
somewhat, and reliance on many traditional production-linked policies is gradually declining. 
The farm policy debate seems to be shifting as the unintended consequences of many 
traditional policy approaches and the benefits of focussing policy efforts more precisely on 
the desired outcomes and beneficiaries are becoming more widely understood. But concrete 
policy actions are lagging behind the public debate, and there is still a very long way to go. 
Given their economic size and importance, the NAFTA countries and the EU have a 
particular contribution to make in assuring a more sustainable global food and agriculture 
production system. On-going multilateral trade negotiations provide an enticing opportunity 
for these countries to demonstrate the leadership necessary to achieve their own domestic 
aims, along with the ambitions of the Doha Development Agenda.              Ash                                                                         18          
                                                                                                             
 
      Figure 1.a.  % PSE by commodity, 2001-03 average - Canada 
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      Figure 1.b.  % PSE by commodity, 2001-03 average – Mexico 
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     Figure 1.c.  % PSE by commodity, 2001-03 average – US 
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    Figure 1.d.  % PSE by commodity, 2001-03 average – EU 
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    Figure 2.  Composition of Producer Support Estimate by country, 1986-88 and 2001-03 
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        Figure 4.  Producer Nominal Protection Coefficient by commodity, OECD average 
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